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Abstract. In this essay, my goal is, fi rst, to describe the most important contem-
porary philosophical approaches to the nature of time, and then, secondly, to 
discuss the ways in which those diff erent accounts bear upon the question of the 
possibility of divine foreknowledge. I shall argue that diff erent accounts of the 
nature of time give rise to diff erent objections to the idea of divine foreknowl-
edge, but that, in addition, there is a general argument for the impossibility of 
divine foreknowledge that is independent of one’s account of the nature of time. 
I. A FUNDAMENTAL DIVIDE: 
STATIC VERSUS DYNAMIC VIEWS OF TIME
1.1. An Intuitive Characterization of the Divide
Th e most fundamental divide between diff erent philosophical theories 
concerning the nature of time is that between what are usually referred 
to, on the one hand, as tenseless theories of time, and, on the other, tensed 
theories – though some philosophers, and this is my own predilection, 
prefer to talk instead of a distinction between static theories of time and 
dynamic theories of time.
One way of describing this divide is in terms of diff erent accounts of 
tensed concepts – that is, the concept of the present, and of other con-
cepts that involve the concept of the present, such as the concept of the 
past and the concept of the future. Th us, according to tensed or dynamic 
approaches to the nature of time, tensed concepts are ontologically sig-
nifi cant, either because there are special tensed properties that events can 
have or fail to have – including the property of presentness, and, on some 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 1 (2010), PP. 143–163
144 MICHAEL TO OLEY
accounts, also the properties of pastness and futurity – or, alternatively, 
because there are divisions between the past, the present, and the future, 
with regard to existence itself.
By contrast, according to tenseless or static approaches to the nature 
of time, there are no special properties of presentness, pastness, or futu-
rity, nor is there any ontological divide between past, present, and future: 
events past, present, and future are all equally real.
How, then, are tensed concepts to be understood, according to tense-
less or static approaches to the nature of time? Th e answer is that the 
term “now”, and similar expressions such as “the present”, along with 
present-tense endings on verbs, are all to be understood as pure indexical 
terms, on a par with the spatial indexicals “here” and “there”. Th us, just as 
to say that something is happening here, rather than there, is neither to 
assign some special, ‘spatially tensed’ property to that event, nor to refer 
to some ontological gulf between things that are here and things that are 
there, but, rather, is simply to say what could equally be said by saying 
that the event in question is happening at this spatial location, so to say 
that an event is happening now is simply to say that the event is happen-
ing at this very moment, at this temporal location. Similarly, to say that 
an event happened in the past, or will happen in the future, is simply to 
say that the event is, respectively, either earlier than this very moment, or 
later than this very moment.
1.2. Truth and Actuality: Simpliciter Versus Temporally-Indexed
Th ere is, however, what is to my mind a philosophically more important 
way of describing the diff erence between static and dynamic accounts of 
the nature of time. If there are tensed properties of presentness, pastness, 
and futurity, then events will change with respect to those properties: an 
event will initially have the property of futurity, will lose it and acquire 
the property of presentness, which it will have for only a moment, and it 
will then lose that property, and acquire the property of pastness. Which 
tensed propositions are true with regard to a given event will therefore 
depend upon what time it is.
Similarly, if there is some ontological divide among past events, 
present events, and future events, then there will be times as of which 
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a given event is not actual, is not real, and other times when it is actual. 
Consequently, propositions about a given event will, once again, not al-
ways have the same truth-value.
Compare the situation if a static or tenseless view of time is correct. 
Th e truth-value of a proposition will, in that case, not depend upon what 
time it is, since a given event cannot lie on diff erent sides of an onto-
logical divide between existence and nonexistence at diff erent times: all 
events, past, present, and future, are equally real. Nor, if there are no spe-
cial tensed properties, is there any possibility for an event to diff er with 
regard to what tensed properties it has at diff erent times.
It is true that what tensed sentences are true will depend upon what 
time it is. At one moment, it will be true to say that event E is now hap-
pening, while at a later moment it will be true instead to say that event 
E has happened, and not true to say that it is now happening. But that 
doesn’t mean that there is some proposition that has gone from being 
true to being false. For if the term “now” is, as defenders of tenseless ap-
proaches to time hold, simply a temporal indexical, then the utterance 
of a given type of tensed sentence at diff erent times must necessarily ex-
press diff erent propositions, since the temporal indexical term – such as 
“now” – refers indexically to diff erent times when the sentence is uttered 
at diff erent times.
Th e upshot is this. According to static or tenseless views of time, the 
appropriate concept of truth is what might be called truth simpliciter, un-
derstood as a relation between propositions and what is actual simplic-
iter. For if all events, past, present, and future are equally real, and there 
are no special tensed properties, then the totality of what is actual cannot 
diff er from one moment to another, and because that cannot diff er, what 
propositions are true cannot diff er from one moment to another. Th e 
only relevant notions of truth and actuality, therefore, are the concept 
of what is true simpliciter, and the concept of what is actual simpliciter: 
there is no place for any temporally indexed concept of truth, or for any 
temporally indexed concept of what is actual.
Th e situation is very diff erent given a dynamic or tensed approach to 
the nature of time, since if there is some ontological divide between past, 
present, and future events with respect to reality, or if there are special 
tensed properties that objects can acquire and lose, then a given proposi-
tion can have diff erent truth values at diff erent times. So, although the 
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notion of truth simpliciter may also be needed – I have argued elsewhere 
that it is – a temporally indexed notion of truth – the concept of truth at 
a time – is absolutely indispensible given any tensed or dynamic ap-
proach to the nature of time. Similarly, a temporally indexed notion of 
actuality is needed – the concept of what is actual as of a given time – as 
can be seen in either of two ways. First of all, given a correspondence 
theory of truth, what propositions are true cannot vary from one time 
to another unless the totality of what is actual as of one time diff ers from 
the totality of what is actual as of another time. Secondly, if there are 
special tensed properties, then the tensed states of aff airs that any given 
event is involved in must diff er between some times: at one time, the 
state of aff airs that is event E’s having the property of presentness belongs 
to the totality of what is actual, whereas, at other times, it does not, hav-
ing been replaced by the state of aff airs that consists of event E’s having 
instead the property of pastness. Alternatively, if the dynamic nature of 
the world derives instead from some ontological divide between past, 
present, and future events, then the totality of what is actual as of one 
time will include event E, whereas the totality of what is actual as of some 
other time may very well not include event E.
To sum up, then, there are, on the one hand, the absolute concepts 
of truth simpliciter and of what is actual simpliciter, and, on the other 
hand, there are the temporally indexed notions of truth at a time, and of 
the totality of what is actual as of a given time. Th e latter pair of notions 
is crucial for any tensed or dynamic view of the nature of time, whereas 
only the former, absolute notions of truth and of actuality play any role 
in the case of tenseless or static views of the nature of time.
II. DIFFERENT THEORIES OF THE NATURE OF TIME
2.1. Static Th eories of the Nature of Time
Static theories of the nature of time do diff er on certain matters, of which 
the most important are perhaps the following:
 (1) Precisely what account is to be given of tensed sentences?
 (2) What account is to be given of the later than relation, and of the 
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direction of time? Is the later than relation a basic, unanalyz-
able relation? Is the direction of time to be explained in terms 
of some concept in physics, such as the direction of increase in 
entropy, or the expansion of the universe? Or is the direction of 
time to be analyzed in terms of the relation of causation?
Th ese diff erences, however, philosophically important though they are, 
are not crucial, I think, in the context of questions concerning the pos-
sibility of divine foreknowledge. What is important in that context is 
the thesis, shared by all static approaches to time, that all events, past, 
present, and future, are equally real, and that there cannot be any change, 
over time, with regard to the totality of what is actual. 
2.2. Dynamic Th eories of the Nature of Time
Tensed or dynamic theories of the nature of time take a number of very 
diff erent forms, of which the most important, I think, are the following.
2.2.1. Th e ‘Growing Block’ View
Th is is the view that the states of aff airs that are actual as of any given 
time are the states of aff airs that exist at that time plus the states of aff airs 
that exist at earlier times, but not the states of aff airs that exist at later 
times. In short, past and present events are actual as of a given time, but 
not future events.
On this view there is no special, intrinsic property of presentness. 
Presentness is, instead, a structural property: the states of aff airs that are 
present at a given time are the states of aff airs that are the latest among 
the totality of states of aff airs that are actual as of the time in question.
2.2.2. Storrs McCall’s ‘Concrete Possible Futures’ View of Time
A diff erent view, but one that is in most respects closely related to grow-
ing block views, has been advanced by the Canadian philosopher, Storrs 
McCall (1994). His idea is to treat future possibilities in a way that is 
similar to that in which David Lewis treated all logical possibilities, so 
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that just as Lewis held that each logically possible state of aff airs exists 
somewhere in a concrete possible world, so McCall holds that possible 
future states of aff airs all exist as concrete states of aff airs. What happens, 
then, is that as time passes, there is a moment when all of the branches 
that existed at that time drop out of existence, except for a single branch. 
Before that happens, there were multiple possibilities for branching at the 
time in question, and because of that, it was indeterminate what would 
be the case at that time. Th e present is thus the point at which the inde-
terminacy that existed concerning what would be the case at the time in 
question is replaced by a single, determinate state of aff airs.
As in the case of the growing block view, then, presentness, rather 
than being an intrinsic property of events, is a structural property: an 
event lies in the present when it lies at the point where the branching 
representing future possibilities begins.
2.2.3. Presentism
Th is is the view, as I would characterize it, that the only states of aff airs 
that are actual as of a given time are the states of aff airs that exist at that 
time. So stated, the question arises as to how any propositions about the 
past can be true. Advocates of presentism have attempted to answer that 
question in various ways, but the main one involves the idea that states 
of aff airs that exist at any given time are not restricted to what might be 
called ‘present tense’ states of aff airs: there are also past tense states of 
aff airs, such as the state of aff airs that consists of Caesar’s having crossed 
the Rubicon, and, perhaps also, future tense states of aff airs, such as the 
fi rst unicorn being created fi ve years from now.
Th ough this position is rather popular, especially in the United States, 
I believe it is open to decisive objections. In particular, I would argue, 
fi rst, that the presentist can off er no satisfactory account of the concepts 
of the past and of the future; secondly, that on presentism there are no 
truthmakers for propositions about the past; and thirdly, that the presen-
tist cannot off er a satisfactory account of cross-temporal relations, includ-
ing causation. 
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2.2.4. Th e ‘Moving Now’ View
A fi nal tensed view that is interesting, but not very popular today, is very 
close to tenseless or static views of time in two respects. First of all, it 
involves the claim that all events, past, present, and future, are actual as 
of every given moment. Secondly, it claims that events are temporally 
ordered by a later than relation – a relation that can either be taken as 
primitive, or analyzed in one of the ways adopted in static accounts of 
the nature of time.
How, then, does this view of time diff er from static views of time? 
Th e answer is that it is claimed that there is a special, intrinsic property 
of presentness that moves along the series of events ordered by the later 
than relation, so that every event has this intrinsic property of present-
ness for a moment. Before it acquires that property, an event lies in the 
future. Once it loses that property, it lies in the past. Th e passage of time 
consists, then, in the movement of this property: it is this movement that 
transforms what would otherwise be what McTaggart referred to as the 
‘B-series’ into McTaggart’s ‘A-series’.
III. THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF FUTURE 
CONTINGENT EVENTS
From a general metaphysical perspective, the crucial divide in the phi-
losophy of time is that between static theories and dynamic theories. It 
seems to me, however, that with regard to issues raised by the idea of 
divine foreknowledge, the crucial divide is a diff erent one – namely, to 
express it in ontological terms, between views on which future states of 
aff airs are either actual simpliciter, or else actual as of the present mo-
ment, and views on which neither of those things is the case. Or, alterna-
tively, to express it in semantical terms, the crucial divide with regard to 
issues raised by the idea of divine foreknowledge is that between views of 
the nature of time on which propositions about future contingent events 
are either true or false, simpliciter, or else true or false at the present 
moment, and views on which neither of these things is the case, since 
propositions about future contingents, rather than being true or false, 
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or true or false at the present time, have, instead, the third truth-value, 
namely, indeterminacy.
If this is right, the crucial division is between, on the one hand, static 
views of the nature of time and the moving Now view, and, on the other, 
the growing block view and McCall’s concrete-possible-futures view. Th e 
main thing that I want to do in the remainder of this talk, then, is to fo-
cus on two diff erent problems that arise for divine foreknowledge, one 
of which arises if future events are real, and the other of which arises if 
they are not. 
IV. HUMAN FREEDOM IN 
A WORLD WITH TENSELESS TIME
Before doing that, however, I want to mention briefl y an argument that is 
sometimes advanced on the basis of the assumption that a static or tense-
less view of time is true. It is an argument that, if correct, would mean 
that there would be no need to consider static or tenseless approaches 
to the nature of time in a context where we are interested in the idea of 
divine foreknowledge of contingent future events.
4.1. An Argument for Logical Fatalism
Th e argument in question can be expressed as follows:
 (1) A static or tenseless view of time is correct.
 (2) Let p be some proposition about a future event, such as the 
proposition that John will perform action A, where A is some 
action that can be performed at time t in the year 2012.
 (3) According to a static or tenseless view of time, every proposition 
is either true simpliciter, or else false simpliciter.
 (4) Th erefore, either p is true, or p is false.
 (5) If a static or tenseless view of time is correct, the truth-value of 
a proposition never changes.
 (6) If the truth-value of a proposition never changes, then either 
a given proposition is always true, or it is always false. 
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 (7) So if p is true, then p is true at all times; while if p is false, then p 
is false at all times.
 (8) Hence, if p is true, then p is true now; while if p is false, p is false 
now.
 (9) Th erefore, either it is now true that John will perform action A, 
or it is now false that John will perform action A.
 (10) If it is now true that John will perform action A, then it is impos-
sible for John not to perform action A.
 (11) If it is impossible for John not to perform action A, then John is 
not free in a libertarian sense with regard to the choice of wheth-
er to perform action A, or to refrain from performing action A.
 (12) If it is now false that John will perform action A, then it is im-
possible for John to perform action A.
 (13) If it is impossible for John to perform action A, then John is not 
free in a libertarian sense with regard to the choice of whether 
to perform action A, or to refrain from performing action A.
 (14) Th erefore, either way, John is not free in a libertarian sense with 
regard to the choice of whether to perform action A, or to re-
frain from performing action A.
 (15) In general, no one is ever free in a libertarian sense with regard 
to the choice of whether to perform a given action A, or to re-
frain from performing that action.
4.2. Th e Unsoundness of this Argument
Notice that if this argument were sound, it would show not only that 
a static or tenseless view of time is incompatible with libertarian free will, 
but also that such a view of time is incompatible with there being any 
indeterministic events. For a precisely parallel argument could be used 
to show, for example, that if an atom undergoes decay at time t, then it 
was logically determined that it would do so.
Th e argument, however, is unsound. Th e error occurs at step (6), 
where the following premise is used:
If the truth-value of a proposition never changes, then either a given propo-
sition is always true, or it is always false.
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Th e problem with this premise is that it imports into a static or tense-
less view of time the notion of truth at a time. Given a static or tenseless 
approach to the nature of time, however, the notion of truth at a time is 
either incoherent, or, at least, has no application to the world. For the 
notion of truth at a time only makes sense if the idea of being actual as of 
a time makes sense, and given a static or tenseless approach to time, no 
sense can be assigned to a temporally-indexed concept of what is actual.
Another way of putting the point is this. On a static or tenseless view 
of time, the truthmaker for a proposition such as that John will perform 
action A, defi ned as a certain action that can be performed at time t in 
the year 2012 is a state of aff airs that exists at the time in question in the 
year 2012. If one says that the proposition in question is now true, that 
is naturally interpreted as saying that a state of aff airs now exists that 
makes the proposition true. But the latter is not the case: there is no such 
state of aff airs. Th e only truthmaker is the state of aff airs that consists of 
John’s performing action A at time t in the year 2012, and the fact that 
John performs that action does nothing at all to make it the case that, 
before he performed that action, he could not have refrained from per-
forming it.
V. DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND THE REALITY
OR UNREALITY OF FUTURE CONTINGENT EVENTS
Let us now consider what potential problems there are for the possibility 
of divine foreknowledge, given diff erent philosophical accounts of the 
nature of time. Basically, there are three questions that we need to an-
swer. First of all, how do things stand if the growing block view of time is 
correct? According to that view, future contingent events are not real, are 
not actual, as of earlier times. If that is the case, what are the implications 
for the possibility of divine foreknowledge of future contingent events?
Secondly, there is Storrs McCall’s concrete-possible-futures view of 
time. Here, rather than there being no future events that are actual as 
of earlier times, all future events are actual, but so, equally, are all fu-
ture possibilities, and there is nothing in that plethora of concrete fu-
ture possibilities that picks out the one pathway through all those future 
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branchings as the unique sequence of events that will actually obtain. 
So what implications does this picture have for the possibility of divine 
foreknowledge? 
Finally, how do things stand given a static or tenseless view of time, 
or on a moving Now view? According to a static or tenseless view, fu-
ture contingent events are actual simpliciter, while according to a moving 
Now view, all events, past, present, and future, except for those that in-
volve the tensed property of presentness, are actual as of every moment. 
So on either a static view of time, or a moving Now view, one has neither 
an absence of future contingent states of aff airs, as on the growing block 
view, nor a multitude of concrete, future possibilities, with nothing to 
mark out the actual future, as on Storrs McCall’s concrete-possible-fu-
tures view: one has, instead, just the actual future events, and so one does 
have events that could in principle be related to divine foreknowledge. Is 
divine foreknowledge possible, then, given either of these views?
VI. DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE, COUNTERFACTUALS, 
AND CAUSATION
What is involved in divine foreknowledge? On the face of it, there would 
seem to be three ways in which a person could have knowledge of future 
events. First of all, the person could be an agent who had the power to 
bring about the future event in question, and could decide to do that. 
Knowing what he had decided to attempt to do, and knowing that he had 
the power to do that, he would be in a position to know that the future 
event in question would occur.
Secondly, if the world contained deterministic laws of nature, and if 
a person had knowledge of relevant laws of nature, and of the present 
state of the world, that person would be in a position to draw conclusions 
about what future events would occur.
But when one is concerned with divine knowledge of future contin-
gent events, such as what some agent with libertarian free will is going to 
do, neither of the two possibilities just mentioned apply: the actions of 
a free agent are not determined, either by God’s actions, or by the opera-
tion of laws of nature. So what other possibility is there?
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A third possibility that certainly springs to mind is that future con-
tingent events could cause corresponding beliefs that are present in the 
mind of God at an earlier time – indeed, at all earlier times.
Th is third possibility requires backward causation, and so one might 
wonder whether there is some other possibility.
Here is an argument, however, in support of the conclusion that divine 
foreknowledge of future contingent events does require causation run-
ning from those future contingent events to beliefs in the mind of God:
(1) Divine foreknowledge requires that God’s beliefs about the future 
are counterfactually dependent upon the future events in question, since 
if some future event had not occurred, God would not have believed that 
it was going to occur.
(2) Th ere are two main approaches to counterfactuals. First, there are 
the similarity-across-possible-worlds accounts, advanced by Robert Stal-
naker (1968) and David Lewis (1973), according to which, on Lewis’s 
version, the counterfactual proposition that if p were true, q would be 
true, is true in the actual world if there is a possible world in which both 
p and q are true that is closer to the actual world than any possible world 
in which p is true but q is false. Secondly, there are causal approaches to 
counterfactuals advocated by, among many others, Frank Jackson (1977) 
and Igal Kvart (1986).
(3) Jonathan Bennett (1974) and Kit Fine (1975), in early reviews of 
David Lewis’s book Counterfactuals, argued that a similarity-across-pos-
sible-worlds approach to counterfactuals leads to incorrect assignments 
of truth-values to certain counterfactuals. Lewis (1979), a few years later, 
set out a method of avoiding the specifi c objections that Bennett and 
Fine advanced. But it can be shown that their objections can be modifi ed 
to produce objections that cannot be blocked (Tooley, 2003). Th e con-
clusion, in short, is that similarity-across-possible-worlds approaches to 
counterfactuals are open to decisive objections. 
(4) Th e upshot is that there does not appear to be any viable alterna-
tive to some sort of causal account of counterfactuals, so that, given that 
God’s beliefs would have to be counterfactually dependent upon future 
contingent events, we have the following conclusion:
Divine foreknowledge of future contingent events requires that those 
events causally give rise to God’s beliefs about them. 
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VII. DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE 
AND THE GROWING BLOCK VIEW OF TIME
Given that conclusion, how do things stand if a growing block view of 
time is correct? To answer that question, one has to ask how the actuality 
of events is related to causation.
In the argument that I off ered in Time, Tense, and Causation for 
a growing block view of time, I attempted to show that the postulates that 
provide a correct analysis of causation can only be satisfi ed in a world 
where causes and their eff ects are related in an asymmetric way to what is 
actual. In particular, I argued that, on the one hand, the eff ect of a cause 
cannot be actual as of the time of its cause, while, on the other hand, 
a cause must be actual as of the time of its eff ect.
Put intuitively, the former must be the case if a cause is to bring its 
eff ect into existence, while the latter is required since it must be true at 
the time of the eff ect that it had a certain cause, and this cannot be so at 
that time unless both the eff ect and its cause are actual as of the time of 
the eff ect.
But if this is right, then, on a growing block view of the nature of time, 
future contingent events cannot causally give rise to earlier beliefs in the 
mind of God, since no future contingent event is actual as of any earlier 
time.
Th e conclusion, in short, is that the combination of a growing 
block view of time with what appear to be plausible claims about when 
a cause and its eff ect are actual poses a problem for the idea of divine 
foreknowledge.
VIII. DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE 
AND THE CONCRETE-POSSIBLE-FUTURES VIEW OF TIME
On Storrs McCall’s concrete-possible-futures account of the nature of 
time, all of the future contingent events that will be actual future events 
are actual as of earlier times. So there could be a causal connection be-
tween all of those events and beliefs in the mind of God.
But the problem is this. Let t be any future time, and let A and B be 
possible future events that, if they occur, will occur at time t. Suppose 
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that event A will actually occur at time t, and that B will not. It could 
be the case that the concrete future possibility that is A will give rise to 
a belief in the mind of God that A will occur, while the concrete future 
possibility that is B will not give rise to a belief in the mind of God that 
B will occur. But what could possibly ensure that this will be the case? It 
seems to me that there is no answer to this question. Th e thing in ques-
tion could occur, but if it did it would be a pure accident. For if there were 
something in the world that could ensure that the future possibilities that 
will later be the ones that are realized will give rise to corresponding be-
liefs in the mind of God, there would have to be something in what was 
actual as of any relevant time that marked out just those concrete future 
possibilities, something that singled them out as the ones that would be 
realized, But on McCall’s model of the nature of time, there is, by defi ni-
tion, nothing that does this.
Finally, I also think that McCall’s concrete-possible-futures view of 
time is open to strong objections. For one thing, what future possibilities 
exist at any given time logically supervenes on the totality of the states 
of aff airs that exist at that time, together with laws of nature, so there is 
absolutely no reason to postulate concrete future possibilities.
McCall’s response to this objection is that, rather than viewing future 
possibilities as logically supervenient upon laws of nature plus present 
states of aff airs, one can instead view laws of nature as logically super-
venient upon future possibilities. But the latter idea is open to two very 
strong objections. Th e nomological possibilities that exist at any one 
time will suffi  ce to fi x what laws of nature there are, but then what makes 
something a law involves an infi nite set of states of aff airs, and this in 
turn makes it extremely improbable that any laws will exist. So the result 
of McCall’s proposal is that there cannot be any solution to the problem 
of justifying induction.
Secondly, the situation is made worse by the fact that, for any two 
future times that one picks, the concrete possibilities that exist at those 
times must defi ne precisely the same set of laws of nature. If laws of nature 
were primary, this would pose no problem at all. But if it is concrete fu-
ture possibilities that are, instead, primary, then it is an inexplicable cos-
mic coincidence that the concrete future possibilities that exist at each of 
an infi nite number of future times all logically determine precisely the 
same laws of nature. 
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IX. DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE 
AND BACKWARD CAUSATION
Let us now consider how things stand with regard to the possibility of 
divine foreknowledge if either a static or tenseless view of time is correct, 
or a moving Now account.
If it is the case either that future events are actual as of the present mo-
ment, as the moving Now account of time holds, or, as static approaches 
to time maintain, future events are actual simpliciter, and a temporally-
indexed view of actuality is metaphysically mistaken, then there is no 
initial barrier to God’s having true beliefs about future contingent events, 
since there are events that are either actual simpliciter, or actual as of 
the relevant time, that could, barring any problems, causally give rise to 
God’s beliefs. 
Th e causation in question would, of course, be temporally backward 
causation, and some philosophers, such as Hugh Mellor in his books 
Real Time (1980), Th e Facts of Causation (1995), and Real Time II (1998), 
have argued that backward causation is logically impossible.
Th ere is a central problem that affl  icts at least most such arguments, 
however – namely, that they attempt to show that backward causation is 
logically impossible by fi rst showing that causal loops are logically im-
possible, and then by arguing that if backward causation were logically 
possible, causal loops would also be logically possible. But the second 
part of this type of argument is very diffi  cult to defend, since there cer-
tainly seem to be logically possible worlds that contain backward causa-
tion, but in which causal loops are nomologically impossible.
In Time, Tense, and Causation, I attempted to show that backward 
causation, even when it did not give rise to causal loops, was logically 
impossible. Th e argument that I off ered, however, also supported a grow-
ing block view of time, and so an appeal to that argument cannot be 
combined with either a tenseless view of time, or a moving Now view.
Th e upshot is that it is not clear that divine foreknowledge can be 
ruled out via an appeal to any proof of the general impossibility of back-
ward causation.
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X. DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND THE POSSIBILITY 
OF UNDERCUTTING CAUSAL LOOPS
Even if such arguments for the logical impossibility of backward cau-
sation can be shown to be unsound, however, this does not eliminate 
a nearby potential problem for divine foreknowledge. Th e reason is that 
even if backward causation is logically possible, it may be that causal 
loops are not.
In his paper “Th e Paradoxes of Time Travel” (1976, 149), David Lewis 
describes the following time travel case:
Consider Tim. He detests his grandfather, whose success in the munitions 
trade built the family fortune that paid for Tim’s time machine. Tim would 
like nothing so much as to kill Grandfather, but alas he is too late. Grandfa-
ther died in his bed in 1957, while Tim was a young boy. But when Tim has 
built his time machine and traveled to 1920, suddenly he realizes that he is 
not too late aft er all. He buys a rifl e; he spends long hours in target practice; 
he shadows Grandfather to learn the route of his daily walk to the munitions 
works; he rents a room along the route; and there he lurks, one winter day in 
1921, rifl e loaded, hate in his heart, as Grandfather walks closer, closer, . . . .
A serious problem is clearly visible. Since Grandfather, in Lewis’s sto-
ry, dies in bed in 1957, evidently Tim, for some reason, did not succeed 
in killing Grandfather. But might he not have succeeded? Must it not 
have been possible for him to succeed? But if he had, and if we assume 
– as is part of Lewis’s story – that Grandfather had not yet fathered the 
son who was Tim’s father – then Tim would, in this counterfactual vari-
ant on Lewis’s story, have undercut the causal chain leading to his own 
existence. So we would have a self-undercutting causal chain: Tim’s kill-
ing of Grandfather would mean no more Grandfather, and, therefore, no 
father, and, therefore, no Tim.
Th e problem, in short, is that even if backward causation in general 
is not logically impossible, if the world is one where backward causal 
processes can connect up with forward causal processes, and vice versa, 
then there is the possibility of causal loops. Some of those causal loops 
may be self-supporting ones, which seems puzzling. Much more threat-
ening, however, are causal loops of the self-undercutting variety. Indeed, 
mightn’t it be argued that such self-undercutting causal loops entail con-
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tradictions: if Tim kills Grandfather, then Tim beings it about that Tim 
doesn’t exist.
Lewis argues that the counterfactual variant does not generate such 
consequences:
If you suppose Tim to kill Grandfather and hold all the rest of his story fi xed, 
of course you get a contradiction. But likewise if you suppose Tom to kill 
Grandfather’s partner and hold the rest of his story fi xed–including the part 
that told of his failure–you get a contradiction. If you make any counter-
factual assumption and hold all else fi xed you get a contradiction. Th e thing 
to do is rather to make the counterfactual supposition and hold all else as 
close to fi xed as you consistently can. Th at procedure will yield perfectly 
consistent answers to the question: what if Tim had killed Grandfather? In 
that case some of the story that I told would not have been true. Perhaps 
Tim might have been the time-traveling grandson of someone else. Perhaps 
he might have been the grandson of a man killed in 1921 and miraculously 
resurrected. Perhaps he might have been not a time-traveler at all, but rather 
someone created out of nothing in 1920 and equipped with false memories 
of a personal past that never was. It is hard to say what is the least revision 
of Tim’s story to make it true that Tim kills Grandfather, but certainly the 
contradictory story in which the killing both does and doesn’t occur is not 
the least revision. Hence it is false (according to the unrevised story) that 
if Tim had killed Grandfather then contradictions would have been true. 
(1976, 152)
Is Lewis’s response satisfactory? I think that it is not, and the reason is 
this. First of all, Lewis’s discussion of what would be the case if Tim killed 
Grandfather makes use of his own similarity-across-possible-worlds ap-
proach to counterfactuals: what would happen is a matter of what is the 
case in the closest possible worlds in which Tim kills Grandfather. But 
such an approach to counterfactuals is demonstrably unsound. Secondly, 
if one switches to a causal approach to such counterfactuals, what would 
have been the case if Tim killed Grandfather is fi xed by what follows in 
virtue of causal laws from the proposition that Tim killed Grandfather 
combined with propositions that describe the minimally modifi ed world 
at the time in question, or shortly before it, which is such that Tim kills 
Grandfather. But when this approach to counterfactuals is adopted, the 
combination of causal laws and the propositions describing that mini-
mally modifi ed world certainly seem to entail Tim’s non-existence.
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Th is whole question certainly needs to be looked at in a much more 
detailed way than I have just done. My point, however, is that this ques-
tion is crucial for the question of the possibility of divine foreknowledge. 
For if, for example, God at some time has foreknowledge of the fact that 
a person, John, will perform action A at time t in 2012, and has that fore-
knowledge because the state of aff airs that is John’s performing action 
A at time t in 2012 brings about, via backward causation, God’s belief 
that John will perform action A at time t in 2012, then God, at the earlier 
time, has the power to make a contradiction true, for being omnipotent, 
he certainly has the power to prevent John from performing action A at 
time t in 2012.
Th e argument, in short, is this. Assume the following thesis, which is 
to be refuted:
 (1) Divine foreknowledge is possible because (a) it is possible either 
that a static or tenseless view of time is right, or that a moving 
Now view of time is right, (b) on either view, there are future 
events that are either actual simpliciter, or actual as of earlier 
times, and (c) backward causation is logically possible, so that 
God can have foreknowledge of a future state of aff airs, S, by 
having beliefs that are caused by S.
Th e refutation of (1) now proceeds as follows: 
 (2) God’s omnipotence makes it possible for him to intervene at the 
earlier time to prevent the later state of aff airs S from occur-
ring.
 (3) Given a correct, causal account of the relevant counterfactuals, 
it follows that if God were to act to prevent the later state of af-
fairs S, it would be true both that S will occur and that S will not 
occur, and so a contradiction would be true.
 (4) Th ere cannot be true contradictions.
 (5) Hence (1) is false. Th e defense of the possibility of divine fore-
knowledge proposed there cannot be correct.
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XI. THE GENERAL APPLICABILITY 
OF THIS FINAL OBJECTION
I have directed this last argument against the conjunction of the proposi-
tion that divine foreknowledge is logically possible with the proposition 
that future events are either actual simpliciter, or actual as of the present 
moment. In fact, however, the objection applies regardless of which view 
of the nature of time one embraces. For on any view of time, divine fore-
knowledge requires that contingent future events can give rise to beliefs, 
or belief-like states, in the mind of God, and God, being omnipotent, can 
then act on the world to bring about a state of the world at some time 
prior to the contingent, future event in question, where the state is such 
as to rule out the occurrence of the contingent, future event in question. 
Regardless of the view that one adopts concerning the nature of time, 
then, divine foreknowledge would entail God’s having the power of mak-
ing contradictions true. But it is logically impossible for contradictions 
to be true, and so it is logically impossible for there to be such a power. 
Accordingly, divine foreknowledge is logically impossible.
SUMMING UP
1. With regard to the possibility of divine foreknowledge, the crucial di-
vision with respect to philosophical views on the nature of time is be-
tween, on the one hand, views according to which future states of aff airs 
are actual, or else actual as of earlier times, and, on the other hand, views 
according to which there are no determinate future events that are ac-
tual, or actual as of earlier times.
2. Th ere are good reasons for holding that divine foreknowledge of 
future contingent events that are neither causally determined nor caused 
by God requires that those future events causally give rise to beliefs in 
the mind of God at earlier times.
3. Causation is either a relation between states of aff airs both of which 
are actual simpliciter, or else a relation where the cause is actual as of the 
time of its eff ect.
4. It follows, given a growing block view, that backward causation is 
not logically possible.
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5. On Storrs McCall’s concrete-future-possibilities view of time, the 
problem is that there is nothing that can make it the case that those con-
crete future possibilities that will ultimately be realized give rise to cor-
responding beliefs in the mind of God.
6. If either the moving Now view of time, or a static or tenseless view 
of time is correct, then there are future states of aff airs that either are 
actual, or else actual as of earlier times, so if backward causation is logi-
cally possible, it initially looks as if future states of aff airs can causally 
give rise to corresponding beliefs in the mind of God. But now the prob-
lem is that, because of God’s omnipotence, undercutting causal loops 
are possible, and given a sound account of the truth conditions of coun-
terfactuals, it appears to follow that God would have the power to make 
contradictions true. Since nothing can have that power, this account of 
the possibility of divine foreknowledge also appears untenable.
7. Th e argument based on the idea of undercutting causal loops is not 
restricted to the combination of divine foreknowledge with views of the 
nature of time according to which contingent, future events are either ac-
tual simpliciter, or actual as of earlier times. It is an argument against the 
possibility of divine foreknowledge regardless of what view one adopts 
concerning the nature of time
8. Overall Conclusion: Th e idea of divine foreknowledge gives rise to 
very serious problems, and there is a very plausible, and completely gen-
eral argument that appears to show that divine foreknowledge is logically 
impossible.
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